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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on June 22, 1977, in Coeur 
D'Alene, Idaho. One child was born as issue of the marriage, 
Leslie Erin Inabnit, currently age 9. (R.l) 
2. Respondent worked in Appellant's business during most of 
their marriage. Her efforts contributed to the value of the 
businesses and to Appellant's ability to earn income. (TR.89,93-
94) 
3. During the marriage, the parties acquired certain real 
property from JSB in Montana and resold it to Collins on 
contract. The resale is referred to as the Collins contract. 
The contract provided that Collins would pay approximately 
$17,000. $12,000 remained owing to the original seller, JSB, but 
did not become due until JSB could furnish good title. As of the 
date of the trial, August 31, 1987, the title had still not been 
cleared and the $12,000 was not due to JSB. (TR.75 & 77) 
4. When the parties moved from Montana to Vernal, Utah, the 
parties had no assets to speak of and considered filing for 
bankruptcy. (TR.46, 48) All assets that the parties now have 
have been maintained by payments from marital funds. The parties 
made good money for several years in Vernal. (TR.48) 
5. On December 15, 1986, a deposit of $17,320.86 was made 
in an account reflecting the Collins payment. (TR.77) Of this 
Appellant stated a total of $12,000 went into the car business. 
(TR.59) 
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6. On January 26, 1987, $11,000 was withdrawn and investe 
in the mobile home lot and car business. (TR.78) On the day th 
Amended Verified Divorce Complaint was filed, May 28, 1987 
another $4,000 was withdrawn and on May 29, 1987, another $3,00 
was withdrawn and both invested in the car business and mobil 
home lot. (TR.78-79) 
7. In March of 1987, the balance in one account was $7,52 
and on April 17, 1987, the balance in another account wai 
$14,368. 
8. Respondent worked in Vernal even after Appellant tol< 
her that she no longer had to work because the mobile home lo1 
was paying all of their expenses. (TR.90,93) 
9. In a property proposal Appellant admitted there was 
$18,000 equity in the car business. (TR.84) 
10. During the marriage, the parties purchased a 1987 Dodge 
which Appellant agreed to pay beginning June of 1987 in lieu of 
additional child support. (TR.56) 
11. Respondent received about $9,500 inheritance, paid $950 
in tithing, $1,700 on Appellant's separate property, $1,300 on 
Appellant's share of taxes and the rest of the separate funds 
generally went into the marriage. (TR.96,98-100) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
found the car business was worth $18,000 because, the Appellant 
admitted there was $18,000 equity, Appellant commingled funds he 
has attempted to trace, Appellant invested a recent $11,000 plus 
3 
4,000 plus $3,000 into the business, there was good will 
ssociated with the business, and other factors the court weighed 
n trying to balance the equities between the parties. 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
ound the $3700 past due on sales tax was a common business 
xpense like many other common expenses not discussed by 
ppellant. The court properly refused to diminish the car 
usiness value by the sales tax amount. 
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
equired Appellant to pay for the 1987 Dodge because Appellant 
ad agreed to pay and the court has "considerable discretion" in 
djusting the equities and is not "rigidly bound to the rules of 
1imony". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE CAR 
BUSINESS WAS WORTH $18,000 AND PROPERLY 
AWARDED RESPONDENT ONE-HALF THAT VALUE. 
Ttfe trial court is permitted considerable discretion in 
etting values and adjusting the financial equities of the 
arties. The court can consider commingling of monies, the fact 
hat debts are not due, the amount of money available in 
ifferent accounts, the amount of labor and money invested into a 
usiness, admissions of the parties and the parties' abilities to 
arn income. See Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987); 
ee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987); Alexander v. 
lexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utali 1987). 
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In Petersen, the Supreme Court stated the rule: 
Generally, the trial court is permitted considerable 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property 
interests of the parties to a divorce action, and its 
determinations are entitled to a presumption of 
validity. And although appellate courts may weigh the 
evidence and substitute their judgment for that of the 
trial court in divorce actions, as the Supreme Court 
stated in Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982), 
"this court will not do so lightly and merely because 
its judgment may differ from that of the trial judge. 
A trial court's apportionment of property will not be 
disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice or 
inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." 
(Citations omitted) 
In order to disturb a ruling regarding valuation of marital 
assets and division of assets this court must find a "clear abus< 
of discretion." See Lee. 
The district court found as follows: 
The court finds that ... there is $18,000 equity in the 
automobile business. That the-$12,000 [a debt owed to 
JSB and not related to the car business] is not an 
offset against that equity, that not being connected 
with the car business. 
The parties purchased some real estate sometime in 1977-1981 
from JSB (TR.75), this property was resold to Collins. Whe 
Collins paid, $17,000 was deposited in the bank on December 15 
1986. On January 26, 1987# $11,000 from the same account wa 
withdrawn and put into the car business and mobile home lot. 0 
May 28, 1987, the same date the Amended Verified Divorc 
Complaint was filed, the Appellant withdrew another $4,000 whic 
was put into the business. Again on May 29, 1987, $3,000 wa 
withdrawn and put into the car business. In March of 1987 on 
account had $7,528 and another $14,368. Although there wer 
enough funds around, none of these funds were used to pay off th 
i 
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*bt owing to JSB on the Collins property and in fact the 
villaining balance on the property had not fallen due as the title 
id not been cleared up. 
The funds went into the mobile home lot and the car 
jsiness, yet the Appellant has argued that the entire debt be 
^ducted only from the equity in the car business. Appellant 
ries to keep separate money that was commingled into two 
asinesses and not maintained separate and apart for payment of a 
pecific debt. Appellant has tried to pick and choose debts to 
educt and pick and choose assets from which to deduct debts. 
The court had other facts upon which it could base its 
uling. The court considered evidence before it of income from 
he business, debtsf assets, receivables, donated work by 
ppellant and Respondent, and other factors. The Appellant 
tated he made "good money" for several years in Vernal. (TR.48) 
here was evidence that the mobile home park was meeting all of 
he parties expenses and that Respondent did not have to work. 
TR.91 & 93) 
The Appellant admitted that the car business had "good 
ill". (TR.42) On a "property proposal", the Appellant admitted 
hat he had $18,000 equity in the car business. (TR.84) 
Appellant was able to make more income than Respondent. 
espondent had no skills in the car business* The court balanced 
ill of the different values, assets, receivables, debts, 
ibilities to earn, and other factors brought out in the trial and 
ashioned a fair and proper award which balanced the equities as 
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best the court ccuic. Tne trial court's apportionment should nc 
be disturbed "unless it works such a manifest in3ustice c 
inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." 
The Appellant should not be allowed to select one healt* 
debt unrelated to the car business and argue that it decrease 
the value of the car business. This is especially so when t1 
expense is not yet due because title to property has not be 
cleared. 
*
n
 Alexander
 f the husband argued that the court should ha 
decreased the value of the husband's profit-sharing plan 
account for income tax liability that could be imposed in t 
future. The court held that it would not disturb the tri 
court's valuation and the decision was within the court 
discretion. The court cited Gilbert v. Gilbert, 628 P.2d If 
(Mont. 1981) . 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER IN NOT DEDUCTING 
THE AMOUNT OF PAST DUE SALES TAXES BECAUSE 
THE DEBT WAS A COMMON BUSINESS EXPENSE. 
The common business expense of sales taxes is more unrela 
than the $12,000 debt to JSB discussed above. The same argume 
apply. The sales tax expense should have no greater significa 
to the judge than any other continuing business expense. If 
were to continue with Appellant's argument, we would have 
allow a year <Sf business expenses allowed on Appellant's inc 
tax return. 
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POINT I I I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER IN AWARDING 
PERMANENT ALIMONY AS A PART OF THE PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT. 
The c o u r t o r d e r e d t h e A p p e l l a n t t o p a y a d e b t of t h e 
a r r i a g e . A l t h o u g h , t h e c o u r t c a l l e d t h i s payment of t h e d e b t 
l i m o n y , i t h a s a l l of t h e m a r k i n g s of an a d j u s t m e n t in t h e 
• r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n . The c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y c o n s i d e r e d whe the r or 
tot t o t e r m i n a t e t h e mon th ly c a r payments upon r e m a r r i a g e . The 
r a n s c r i p t p r o v i d e s : 
The p l a i n t i f f i s awarded a l i m o n y in t h e amount of t h e 
b a l a n c e d u e on t h e a u t o m o b i l e c o n t r a c t , w h i c h 
a p p a r e n t l y i s a b o u t t w e n t y - e i g h t o r t w e n t y - n i n e 
p a y m e n t s of $200 .42 e a c h . 
.... 
MR. MCRAE: Terminable on death or remarriage? 
THE COURT: No. That is due on that automobile. He is 
ordered as alimony to pay off that automobile. 
The court has broad discretion in fashioning a division of 
property and alimony. See Lord v. Shawy 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 
L984); Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562 (Utah); Petersen, cited 
above; Alexander, cited above. 
In Petersen, the wife worked during husband's schooling in 
order to put husband through school. The court gave the wife an 
award based upon her contribution, to the husband's advanced 
degree. The trial court characterized the husband's advanced 
degree as property instead of alimony in order- to iavoid the 
termination of an award upon the wife's xemarriage» 
Tiie *court analyzed JAif f*erent approaches to awarding ,a spouse 
a portion o^f thje yalue of an advanced degree and held that the 
" c r i t e r i a for an award of suppor t in Utah a re not so r i g i d " as t< 
cause a harsh r e s u l t . The Supreme Court found t h a t t h e t r i a ] 
" c o u r t chose t o b a l a n c e t h e i n e q u a l i t i e s between the p a r t i e s 
p a r t l y with the alimony award." The Court s u s t a i n e d a f ind ing oi 
al imony which did not t e r m i n a t e upon remar r i age and which workec 
t o r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e w i f e or r e i m b u r s e t h e w i f e f o r hei 
c o n t r i b u t i o n . 
The Sup reme C o u r t in P e t e r s e n f u r t h e r j u s t i f i e d i t s 
d e c i s i o n : 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a 
division of properties, it is a prerogative of the 
[trial] court to make whatever disposition of property 
as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties, (p.242} 
The court in Alexander , awarded no alimony, but ordered the 
husband to pay the couple's outstanding debts in lieu of alimony. 
Whether the court orders the husband to pay a debt and calls it 
permanent alimony or whether the court orders the husband to pay 
a debt and calls it part of the property division makes little 
difference. The court is adjusting the "inequalities between the 
parties.* 
CONCLUSION 
The "trial court is allowed considerable discretion in 
fashioning out* support and a property division that fairly meets 
the equities of the parties. The trial court is present to view 
and observe the demeanor Offwitnesses and to %e£t ^ determine the 
# 
icts and the equities that must be adjusted. 
The Respondent respectfully requests this Court uphold the 
*ard of the trial court. 
Dated this 6th day of April, 1988. 
Attorney'for Respondent 
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